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THE EVOLVING UNIFORM COMMERCIAL




Remember the mythological story of Oedipus and the Sphinx? The
Sphinx asked Oedipus to solve the following riddle:
"[What] goes on four feet in the morning, on two at noonday,
on three in the evening? Man," answered Oedipus. "In child-
hood he creeps on hands and feet; in manhood he walks erect;
in old age he keeps himself with a staff."1
Well in many ways, had(Oedipus been a modern-day commercial
lawyer and been asked to solve this same riddle, he might well have an-
swered not "Man" but the "Uniform Commercial Code." This Essay
will explain why such an answer is not as implausible as it might first
appear. Part II shows that at the time of its initial drafting-its infancy
if you will-the UCC did not represent a truly uniform commercial code.
In fact, its drafters never envisioned the UCC to be a uniform commer-
cial code. Part III shows that with recent additions and proposed revi-
sions, the UCC is slowly developing into something that is much stronger
and more vigorous than before-something that more fully approximates
its name. Finally, part IV concludes that despite its growth and matur-
ity, the UCC may not have a robust old age. Forces are at work that
may weaken the UCC in the years ahead.
II. THE NON-UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: INFANCY
At the time of its initial drafting, it was obvious that the UCC would
not live up to its name. Even if the official text of the UCC had been
enacted in all fifty states, it would not necessarily have resulted in a truly
uniform commercial law in the United States. Furthermore, although it
did govern many areas of what was traditionally viewed as commercial
law (such as sales of goods and letters of credit), the UCC still failed to
cover many important areas of commercial law. Given these gaps in coy-
* Dean and Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.
1. EDITH HAMILTON, MYTHOLOGY 257 (1969).
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erage, the UCC could not have plausibly claimed to represent a compre-
hensive regulation of commercial law. Finally, because it relied heavily
on common-law precedents and subsequent case-law development, the
UCC was not really a code-at least not in the traditional civil-law sense
of that term.
A. Lack of Uniformity
Initially at least, the UCC could not have been expected to create a
uniform commercial law in the United States. There were three main
reasons for this: (1) the UCC's character as state (not federal) legisla-
tion; (2) the UCC's reliance on state common-law principles to supple-
ment its provisions; and (3) the failure of its drafters to devise a
mechanism to referee subsequent divergent judicial interpretations of the
UCC.
1. State as opposed to federal legislation
Because the official text of the UCC had to be enacted in each of the
several states, it was inevitable that legislatures would make non-uniform
amendments to the official text during the process of state-by-state legis-
lative enactment. This occurred when the Uniform Sales Act, and the
Negotiable Instruments Law3 were enacted by the states prior to the
UCC,4 and there was no reason to expect that the UCC would be af-
forded any better treatment. Subsequent events proved this to be true
because every state has modified the official text of the UCC in one way
or another.' Congressional enactment of the UCC, of course, would
have been preferable to achieve the goal of national uniformity, but en-
acting a federalized UCC would not have been politically possible forty
years ago.6
2. UNIF. SALES ACT (1906) (superseded by U.C.C. art. 2).
3. UNIF. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (1896) (superseded by U.C.C. art. 3).
4. Both the Negotiable Instruments Law and the Uniform Sales Act were modified by the
states. See JOSEPH D. BRANNAN, THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW ANNOTATED cxix-
cxxii (4th ed. 1926); Warren L. Shattuck, The Uniform Commercial Code-A Modernization of
Commercial Law, 35 WASH. L. REV. 398, 399-400 (1960).
5. See generally [State UCC Variations] U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) (providing
state-by-state analysis of variations in UCC provisions adopted).
6. See Robert Braucher, Federal Enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 100, 104-12 (1951) (stating that federal enactment of UCC may cause diffi-
culties in areas of state sovereignty, foreign relations, governmental contracts and federal
courts' jurisdiction); Amelia H. Boss, Federalization of Commercial Law, 2 ALI-ABA COURSE
OF STUDY: THE EMERGING NEW UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 675 (1990) (providing ex-
planation of issues concerning federalization of UCC).
[Vol. 26:691
THE EVOLVING UCC
2. State common-law supplementation
The UCC relies on state common law to supplement its provisions
in two important respects. The UCC does not define key terms such as
"offer,"7 "acceptance"' and "possession," 9 thus requiring courts to util-
ize state common-law definitions of these terms when applying the Code.
Similarly, section 1-103 provides that state common-law rules on a wide
variety of questions, including estoppel and waiver, should be used to
supplement UCC provisions unless a particular UCC provision displaces
the common law. 10 Given the differences in state common-law rules, the
drafters of the UCC obviously chose to tolerate a degree of non-uniform-
ity in its development.
3. Lack of a referee mechanism
It was inevitable that even if the official text of the UCC were uni-
formly adopted in each state, subsequent judicial interpretations of its
text would have quickly eroded such uniformity. Although the drafters
made uniformity of interpretation one of the underlying policies of the
UCC,'1 it was unrealistic to expect that such uniformity would be
achieved without some assistance. The drafters, however, did not create
either a formal or an informal mechanism to monitor and referee diver-
gent judicial interpretations of UCC provisions.
B. Not Comprehensively Commercial
The word commercial has as its root the Latin word merx which
means "goods." 12 The drafters' decision to organize UCC coverage
around the concept of "goods" created gaps in the comprehensiveness of
the Code's coverage. The first gap was caused by the limited number of
"goods" transactions included within the scope of the Code. Sales of
"goods" transactions, for example, were specifically included within the
scope of the Code, 3 but bailment, lease and gift transactions were not
specifically included.
7. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-205 (1990) (firm offers), -206 (offer and acceptance in formation
of contract).
8. See, e.g., id. §§ 2-206 (offer and acceptance in formation of contract), -207 (additional
terms in acceptance or confirmation).
9. See, eg., id. § 9-203 (attachment and enforceability of security interest).
10. Id. § 1-103.
11. Id. § 1-102(2)(c).
12. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 990 (6th ed. 1990).
13. See U.C.C. §§ 2-101, -102.
April 1993]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
The second gap was caused by the limited size of a "goods" transac-
tion included within the scope of the Code. For example, many sales of
"goods" contracts include a service component-the installation of new
copper piping in a house involves both the sale of "goods" (the copper
piping) and a sale of services (the installation of the piping). The major-
ity of courts apply the so-called "predominant factor" test to these mixed
goods/services contracts. If the "predominant factor" of the contract is
the sale of the "goods" component, the Code will be applied to the whole
contract-to both the "goods" and the services components.14 But if, on
the other hand, the "predominant factor" of the contract is the services
component, non-Code law will be applied to the whole contract-to both
the "goods" and the services components.15 In some situations, a minor-
ity of courts apply the Code just to the "goods" portion of a contract and
apply non-Code law to the "non-goods" portion of a contract. 6 Adding
further to these coverage difficulties, we see that while the Code may not
be applied to the "goods" portion of a services contract, the Code will be
applied to a negotiable promissory note used in a transaction that has
absolutely nothing to do with "goods." 17
The third gap is caused by the inconsistencies in the types of "non-
goods" transactions included within the scope of the Code. A sale of
pure services (non-goods) is not included within the Code, but a sale of
investment securities"' and certain choses in action19 (also non-goods)
are included within the scope of the Code. The Code covers a standby
letter of credit used to pay a sum of money in a real estate transaction,2 0
but it does not cover a loan secured by real estate.21 As these various
14. See, e.g., Murphy v. Spelts-Schultz Lumber Co., 481 N.W.2d 422, 429 (Neb. 1992)
(using predominant factor test to determine that building contract containing provisions for
both materials and design services was predominantly one for goods).
15. See, eg., Herman v. Bonanza Bldg., Inc., 390 N.W.2d 536, 542 (Neb. 1986) (stating
that UCC was not applicable because predominant purpose of transaction was erection of
building and not transfer of goods).
16. See Foster v. Colorado Radio Corp., 381 F.2d 222 (10th Cir. 1967), in which the court
considered a breach of contract action in the sale of a radio station. The contract contained
provisions relating to goods and non-goods. Id. at 225-26. The court applied the UCC to the
goods provisions and common law to the non-goods provisions. Id. at 226-27.
17. U.C.C. §§ 3-102(a) ("This Article applies to negotiable instruments."), -104(a) (defin-
ing negotiable instrument).
18. Id. art. 8; cf id. § 2-105 (definition of goods specifically excludes investment
securities).
19. Id. § 9-102(l)(b) (sales of accounts and chattel paper). A sale of general intangibles,
however, is not included within the scope of the Code.
20. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 378 A.2d 562 (Conn.
1977); Chiat/Day Inc. v. Kalimian, 483 N.Y.S.2d 235 (App. Div. 1984).
21. Cf U.C.C. § 9-104(j).
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gaps in Code coverage indicate, the UCC fell far short of creating a truly
comprehensive national commercial code.
C. Not a Code
It has been pointed out that the UCC is not a true code in the civil-
law sense of that term. 22 Civil-law codes are first and foremost preemp-
tive.23 They wipe away past legislation and create a fresh start.
The UCC does not pretend to do this-in fact it takes the opposite
approach. In section 1-103, for example, the drafters state that to the
extent that a UCC provision does not displace the principles of law and
equity, these principles remain good law.24 One commentator graphi-
cally illustrated the non-preemptive nature of the UCC by analogizing
UCC provisions to islands floating in the sea of the common law. If
there is no land, the sea of the common law takes over.
Similarly, this use of pre-Code law to supplement UCC provisions
creates a second difference between the UCC and civil-law codes. A
civil-law code systematically regulates its own area of coverage, provid-
ing general principles to be applied to topics not specifically addressed in
the text. The UCC's approach is different. Instead of providing general
principles to be applied to topics not specifically covered by the text, the
UCC relies on state common law to fill these gaps in coverage. One com-
mentator has called the UCC a "common law code" to differentiate it
from the more traditional civil-law code.25
III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE:
MATURITY
As demonstrated in part II, initially at least, the UCC failed to live
up to its name. In recent years, however, due mainly to the addition of
new articles to the Code and proposed revisions to existing articles, the
Code is beginning to evolve into a truly national commercial code. Part
III explains this evolution.
22. Grant Gilmore, Article 9: What It Does for the Past, 26 LA. L. REv. 285, 285-86
(1966); Grant Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037, 1042-43
(1961) [hereinafter Gilmore, Legal Realism].
23. Gilmore, Legal Realism, supra note 22, at 1042.
24. U.C.C. § 1-103 states: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the
principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to
contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake,
bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions." Id.
25. Gilmore, Legal Realism, supra note 22, at 1044-45.
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A. The Uniformity of the UCC
As demonstrated in part II of this Essay, the character of the UCC
as state, rather than federal legislation prevented the emergence of a truly
uniform commercial law throughout the United States. State-by-state
enactment of the UCC inevitably led to the addition of non-uniform
amendments to the official UCC text. Reliance on common-law rules to
supplement UCC provisions also assured state-by-state variations. Fur-
thermore, the failure of the UCC drafters to provide a mechanism limit-
ing divergent state judicial interpretations of UCC provisions contributed
to this lack of national uniformity.
A congressionally enacted UCC, of course, would have been the
most effective way to achieve a truly uniform commercial law regime in:
the United States. Despite the presumed benefits of such a federalized
UCC, Congress has not made any serious movement towards enacting a
national commercial code. Where the interest in national uniformity has
been particularly compelling, however, there have been specific "federal-
izations" of commercial law issues.26
In order to help achieve this goal, the Permanent Editorial Board
(PEB) of the UCC recently took a modest step toward making the UCC
more uniform. In 1987 the PEB resolved to issue supplemental UCC
commentaries (PEB Commentaries), in which the PEB would state, inter
alia, a preferred resolution of a UCC issue on which judicial or scholarly
opinion has differed." These PEB Commentaries represent an attempt
to promote uniformity not only "after the fact," by trying to harmonize
existing divergent UCC interpretations, but also "before the fact," by ap-
plying UCC principles to new or changed circumstances. Since its 1987
resolution, nine PEB Commentaries have been issued.28
The evolution of a more uniform UCC is assisted not only by these
PEB Commentaries, but also by the UCC's own text. Over the years,
UCC provisions have influenced the substance of state common-law
rules-particularly state common-law contract rules.29 This has had the
effect of narrowing the gap between the two sets of legal rules. These two
26. See Regulation J, 12 C.F.R. pt. 210 (1992); Regulation CC, 12 C.F.R. pt. 229 (1990);
Magnuson-Moss Consumer Products Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1988); Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1677 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
27. PEB Resolution on Purposes, Standards and Procedures for PEB Commentary to the
UCC, [PEB Commentaries] U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) vii (Mar. 14, 1987).
28. Id. at 1.
29. See Data Processing Serv., Inc. v. L.H. Smith Oil Corp., 492 N.E.2d 314, 318-20 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1986) (using UCC definitions to determine whether contract should be governed by
UCC or state common-law contract principles).
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developments can be seen as small but encouraging steps towards achiev-
ing greater commercial law uniformity throughout the United States.
B. The Comprehensiveness of UCC Coverage
When the UCC was initially enacted, it did not cover all forms of
commercial transactions. During the last decade, however, the enact-
ment of Articles 2A and 4A have filled several important gaps in the
UCC's coverage. Article 2A governs leases of goods,"0 and Article 4A
governs electronic funds transfers.31
Similarly, the ongoing process of revising existing UCC articles
promises to enlarge the scope of these articles. For example, the Article
9 study committee recently recommended including deposit accounts
and most forms of tort claims within the scope of a revised Article 9 and
widening the coverage of Article 9 to cover credit card receivables.32 The
drafters have enlarged the scope of Article 8 to encompass uncertificated
securities,33 and the recent revision of Article 3 establishes, for the first
time, rules governing cashier's checks.34
The addition of the two new UCC articles and the impending revi-
sions of the current articles enlarge the coverage of the UCC, making it
more comprehensively commercial. The expanding coverage, however,
has not been fortuitous. While the drafters of the UCC did not provide a
mechanism for keeping the UCC uniform, they did create mechanisms
by which UCC provisions could grow and adapt to changing market-
place practices. The two most important mechanisms are the open-
textured nature of the UCC's default rules and the primacy that the UCC
gives to the agreement of the parties.
1. "Open-textured" provisions
UCC provisions tend to be open-textured in their drafting-that is,
they are drafted in such a way that they can easily accommodate future
changes in marketplace practices. This ability to accommodate future
marketplace practices has always been the hallmark of merchant law- of
which the UCC is a part. The UCC's adaptability can most clearly be
seen in its definitions and scope sections.
30. U.C.C. § 2A-102.
31. Id. §§ 4A-102, -104(a).
32. PEB STUDY GROUP UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9 REPORT, PEB FOR
THE UCC 48-49, 58-59, 68-71 (1992).
33. See U.C.C. § 8-102(b).
34. See id. § 3-104(g); Id. § 3-104 cmt. 4.
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a. definitions
Normally, UCC definitions are purposely left open-ended-precisely
to allow the definition to accommodate itself to new business practices.
Article 9, for example, defines "general intangibles" as "any personal
property... other than goods, accounts, chattel paper, documents, in-
struments, and money."35 The open-ended nature of this definition is
readily apparent. Whenever a new or unusual form of personal property
is used by a lender as collateral for a loan, it will be deemed to be a
general intangible unless it can fit into some other definition of Article 9
collateral.16 But even these other Article 9 definitions of collateral are
open-ended in their drafting. The Article 9 definition of an "instru-
ment," for example, includes not only a negotiable instrument but "any
other writing which evidences a right to the payment of money and.., is
of a type which is in the ordinary course of business transferred by deliv-
ery with any necessary indorsement or assignment."37 This language
sweeps into its orbit new forms of transferable rights to payment.
b. scope sections
Like UCC definitions, UCC scope sections were drafted to permit
growth. For example, UCC section 2-102 states that Article 2 applies to
"transactions in goods."3" Although Article 2 was called the "Sales Ar-
ticle,"39 the drafters obviously invited the courts, through the use of the
word "transactions" in section 2-102, to apply Article 2 provisions to
nonsales transactions.'4  Many courts have acted on this invitation and
have extended Article 2 provisions by analogy to lease transactions.41
35. Id. § 9-106.
36. See In re George, 85 B.R. 133 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1988) (holding that entitlement pay-
ments to farmer are general intangibles), aff'd, 119 B.R. 800 (D. Kan. 1990); Underground
Flint, Inc. v. Viro, Inc., 80 B.R. 87 (W.D. Mich. 1982) (holding that liquor license is general
intangible).
37. U.C.C. § 9-105(i).
38. Id. § 2-102.
39. See id. § 2-101.
40. Id. §§ 2-101, -102 & cmt.
41. See United Van Lines v. Hertz Penske Truck Leasing, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 283 (W.D.
Wash. 1989); In re Pacific Sunwest Printing, 6 B.R. 408 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980); Hill v.
Bentco Leasing, Inc., 708 S.W.2d 608 (Ark. 1986); Advanced Computer Sales, Inc. v. Size-
more, 366 S.E.2d 303 (Ga. 1988); Walter E. Heller & Co. v. Convalescent Home of First
Church, 365 N.E.2d 1285 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); Todd Equip. Leasing Co. v. Milligan, 395 A.2d
818 (Me. 1978); USM Corp. v. Arthur D. Little Sys., Inc., 546 N.E.2d 888 (Mass. App. Ct.
1989); Industralease Automated & Scientific Equip. Corp. v. R.M.E. Enters., Inc., 396




This process of analogical application of Article 2 sales rules to lease
transactions was instrumental in the ultimate inclusion of Article 2A in
the official text of the UCC.42 First, application of Article 2 rules to lease
transactions symbolically claimed the area of personal property leasing
for the UCC. Second, by pointing out the many similarities between
sales and lease transactions, this process of analogical application of Arti-
cle 2 rules to lease transactions persuaded many that a new UCC article
on leases made more sense than a free-standing personal property leasing
act.43
The scope section of Article 5 on letters of credit also demonstrates
this same adaptive pattern." Although Article 5 was drafted with com-
mercial letters of credit primarily in mind,45 the open-textured definition
of a "letter of credit" allowed courts to apply Article 5 rules to new
forms of letters of credit that appeared in the marketplace.4
2. Agreement of the parties
UCC section 1-102(3) states a fundamental principle of UCC con-
struction. According to this provision, "[t]he effect of provisions of [the
UCC] may be varied by agreement" except in several specified circum-
stances.47 UCC section 1-201(3) defines agreement broadly to include
"the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language or by impli-
cation from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage of
trade or course of performance. ' 48 The UCC was constructed as a series
of "default rules"-standardized rules that will be applied to a transac-
tion absent a contrary agreement between the parties to the transaction.
Because a contrary agreement between the parties will include applicable
usages of trade, UCC default provisions must, therefore, yield to any
contrary usages of trade.49 This primacy given by the UCC to the agree-
42. Id. § 2A-101 cmt.
43. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws initially proposed
a Personal Property Leasing Act in response to the need for regulating the lease of goods. See
id. The Act, however, was shelved after it was determined that Article 2A (Leases) would be a
better alternative. Id.
44. Id. § 5-102.
45. Commercial letters of credit involving the international sale of goods are centuries old;
standby letters of credit involving loan and other nonsales of goods transactions are of recent
vintage. See JOHN F. DOLAN, THE LAW OF LETTERS OF CREDIT 1.01 (2d ed. 1991); H.C.
GUTrERIDGE & MAURICE MEGRAH, THE LAW OF BANKERS' COMMERCIAL CREDITS 15 (7th
ed. 1984).
46. See U.C.C. § 5-102(c); id. § 5-102 cmt. 1.
47. Id. § 1-102(3).
48. Id. § 1-201(3).
49. Id.
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ment between the parties (and therefore inferentially to usages of trade)
allows the UCC to adapt easily to new marketplace practices.
C. The Nature of the UCC as a Code
In the strict technical sense, the UCC is no more a code today than
it was forty years ago. Unlike a civil-law code, the UCC is not preemp-
tive-it does not wipe away pre-Code law. On the contrary, the UCC
uses pre-Code law to fill gaps in its coverage. Similarly, the UCC does
not pretend to represent a systematic regulation of all aspects of commer-
cial law. In 1993 there are still areas of commercial law not covered by
the UCC.5 0
The fact that the UCC is neither preemptive nor systematic in its
coverage has not caused major problems. Consider the nonpreemptive
nature of the UCC. A preemptive civil-law code does not rely for its
interpretation on prior law-presumably because the code rules are
thought to represent a more modem approach to regulation. The UCC
relies not so much on pre-Code law as non-Code law to fill gaps in its
coverage. This distinction is important. UCC section 1-103 states that
"[u]nless displaced by the particular provisions of [the UCC], the princi-
ples of law and equity, including the law merchant.., shall supplement
[the UCC's] provisions.""1 In our legal system, the principles of law and
equity are not static; they are constantly growing and developing. Thus,
the drafters of the UCC chose to supplement its provisions with bodies of
rules that are themselves constantly being modernized and, one should
not forget, constantly being influenced by the philosophy of the UCC
itself. Thus, the fact that the UCC is not preemptive should not be
equated with a reliance on outmoded legal rules to supplement its
provisions.
Just as it is not preemptive, the UCC also is not systematic in its
coverage. Each article covers a discrete type of mercantile transaction-
sales, negotiable instruments, letters of credit and so forth. But as we
have seen earlier, the open-textured nature of the UCC's definitions and
scope sections have allowed the UCC to adapt to new developments in
the marketplace and, in some cases, to provide regulatory structures not
originally covered by a Code article. This structural elasticity has made
the admittedly non-systematic nature of the UCC less problematic than
it might have been.
50. See RESTATEMENT OF LAW OF SURETYSHIP § 3 cmt. a (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1992)
(ALI) (noting that UCC only covers suretyship relations created by negotiable instruments).
51. U.C.C. § 1-103.
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IV. THE UCC IN THE DECADES AHEAD: OLD AGE
How will the UCC fare in the decades ahead? Although it is always
dangerous to act as a prophet, it seems that the UCC will begin to play a
diminishing role in mercantile transactions in the years ahead. There are
two primary reasons for this: (1) increased international trade; and
(2) the growing implications of third-party rights in commercial
transactions.
A. Increased International Trade
In 1960 exports and imports constituted 10.5% of the United States
gross domestic product. 2 Twenty-five years later in 1985, exports and
imports had grown to 23.3% of the gross domestic product.5 3 This in-
creased international trade has inevitably encouraged efforts to develop
international conventions and model laws to regulate this commerce in
lieu of using the purely domestic legislation of any one country. The
Convention on the International Sale of Goods54 was a successful effort
to develop a special set of rules for international sales of goods con-
tracts.55 Other international efforts are underway to harmonize the law
of negotiable instruments, electronic funds transfers and letters of
creditl--to name but a few. This movement towards creating an inter-
national commercial law regime will undoubtedly continue. The UCC
was so successful in the United States precisely because, as a country, we
share both a common legal tradition and a common core of social values.
No such common legal tradition or common core of social values exists
that would allow for the acceptance of the UCC worldwide.
B. The Growing Implication of Third-Party Rights in Commercial
Transactions
Dean Robert Clark of Harvard Law School has observed that the
gradual increase in wealth during the last decades has led people to de-
mand a higher order of rights-one of which is the right to a clean envi-
52. Robert C. Clark, Why So Many Lawyers? Are They Good or Bad?, 61 FORDHAM L.
REV. 275, 288 (1992) (citing COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS, 1989 ANN. REP. B-1, B-8).
53. Id. (citing COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS, 1989 ANN. REP. B-1, B-8).
54. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11,
1980, S. TREATY Doc. No. 9, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), reprinted in 52 Fed. Reg. 6264
(1987).
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., United Nations General Assembly: Report of the Working Group on Interna-
tional Contract Practices on the Work of its Sixteenth Session, U.N. GAOR 9th Comm., 25th
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/358 (1992).
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ronment" Responding to demands for higher order rights is
complicated, requiring "elaborate relationships among people and orga-
nizations.""8 These elaborate relationships, he points out, require struc-
turing by sets of rules that cannot be derived from the marketplace.59
Parties that make a contract for the manufacture and sale of chemicals
can structure a contractual set of rules governing their relationship as
seller and buyer, but cannot easily structure a set of rules to deal with the
potential environmental impact of the manufacture of the chemicals.
These rules are best created by government. As commercial transactions
(such as sales and financing transactions) are viewed more and more as
implicating this higher order of rights-particularly health and environ-
mental rights-inevitably the private agreement of the parties will be re-
stricted by governmental rules enforcing this higher order of rights. In
such a regime, the realm of freedom of contract and marketplace default
rules-two hallmarks of the UCC-will most likely have diminished
importance.
V. CONCLUSION
If a modern-day Oedipus had answered "the UCC" to the riddle of
the Sphinx, the answer would have had some plausibility. In its infancy,
the UCC did not constitute a truly uniform and comprehensively com-
mercial code. But as it grew to maturity, the UCC more and more began
to live up to its name-particularly as the scope of its coverage began to
expand. The UCC, however, may not be able to look forward to a useful
and respected old age. The globalizaiton of commerce and the growing
complexity of commercial transactions will most likely translate into a
diminished importance for the UCC in the decades ahead.
57. Clark, supra note 52, at 291.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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